Implicit R&D strategy and investment-linked R&D: a study of the R&D programme of the Argentina steel firm Acindar, SA by Maxwell, Philip
United Nations 
Economic Commission 
for Latin America 
Inter-American 
Development Bank 
Buenos Aires Office 
IDB/ECLA Research Programme 
in Science and Technology 
Working Paper N° 23 
IMPLICIT R £ D STRATEGY AND 
INVESTMENT-LINKED R S D 
A Study of the R S D Programme of the 






790322 ORIGINAL: ENGLISH 
Philip Maxwell is a full-time Research Fellow with the IDB/ECLA Regional 
Programmeof Research in Science and Technology. He is based at the Programme's 
offices in Buenos Aires. 
The author wishes to thank the Directors of Acindar for generously allowing 
access to their presentations to the Sub-secretariat for Science and Technology 
containing the information on the R £ D projects analysed in this paper. In addi-
tion, he warmly thanks Dr. Sergio Brodsky, of Acindar, for his hospitality and 
advice in clarifying points arising in the presentations. Thanks are also due to 
Dr. Jose Bagg of Acindar, for a useful inteview which provided additional infor-
mation on some of the projects. 
Within the IDB/ECLA Programme, Dr. Jorge Katz, The Programme's Director, has 
all along encouraged the detailed analysis of firms' R £ D Projects, and his su-
pport and constructive criticism has been decisive in making this paper possible. 
The author is also grateful to Ing. Ricardo Cibotti, Ing. Adolfo Canitrot, Dr. 
Francisco Sercovich, Mr. Jorge Lucangeli- and Mr. Julio Fidel for helpful criticism 
made during an internal seminar in the IDB/ECLA Programn£ at which an earlier draft 
of the paper was discussed. 
The views put forward in the paper are, of course, purely the author's res-
ponsibility, and should not be taken to reflect the views of either Acindar or of 
the IDB/ECLA Programme. 
Programa BID/CEPAL 
Oficina de la CEPAL en Buenos Aires 
Callao 67 - Piso 3o 
1022, Buenos Aires - Argentina 
CONTENTS 
I » Introduction ..................................................... 1 
II Characteristics of Acindar's R £ D Project Portfolio ............. 5 
III An Exploration of Localized "Investment-Linked" R £ D 11 
Towards a simple model 13 
IV Some Aspects of Acindar's R & D "Strategy" 21 
Towards a more "explicit" R 6 D Strategy 2k 
V Conclusions 27 
Appendix 29 
List of Diagrams and Tables 
Diagram 1 Isoquant of K 6 R Input Combinations required to produce 
a 20% increase in a plant's production capacity. 15 
Diagram 2 Isoquants of K 6 R Input Combinations required to produce 
an X% production capacity increase by means of (i) a capi-
tal-intensive designj and (ii) a capital-substituting de-
sign. 18 
Table 1 Classification of the Stimuli of the 51 R 6 D Projects 22 
Table 2 Classification of the 54 R £ D Projects in Terms of the 
Nature of the Work Involved. 31 
Table 3 Ranking of the 54- R 6 D Projects in Decreasing Order of 
the Estimated Input by Acindar of man-months of univer-




Otitil now9 not much detailed empirical research has been done into the charac-
teristics of the local R 6 D programmes and R £ D projects 1/carried out by Latin 
American firms. 
This seems dues to the fact that (a) the whole subject of local technology 
creation by Latin American firms has only recently become the focus of intensive 
research, and (b) most of the local technology creation efforts identified so far 
have been of the "implicit" kind i.e. associated with direct production activities, 
or organized on an ad-hoc basis, rather than being organized explicitly as "R & D". 
or carried out in a separate "R £ D" department. 
It nevertheless seems useful to enquire empirically into the nature and econo-
mic characteristics of the "portfolios" of R £ D projects which Latin American firms 
operate with -even if most of these projects are of the "implicit" rather than "ex-
plicit" kinds, and even if the R £ D programme or strategy of the firms concerned 
was mostly an unconscious programme whose characteristics are recognisable "ex-post-
facto" by the investigator, but were not actually deliberately planned in this way 
by the firm. 
In our view such- empirical enquiries into R £ D project portfolios promise two 
kinds of useful results: first of all they should lead towards an exact specifica-
tion of the kinds of R 6 D projects that get performed, an indispensable first step 
prior to theorising: second, they should lead to some kind of characterization of 
R £ D Programmes on the basis of their degree of "explicitness". As a result, it 
should be possible to begin to see how explicit, articulate R £ D programmes actua-
lly emerge from, or succeed, their more primitive predecessors. 
Such considerations suggest that empirical studies of Latin American firr®' 
R £ D project portfolios would be worthwhile to perform. Yet, published empirical 
analysis or even description of such portfolios is only now beginning to become 
available. 2/ 
1/ "phe accepted short form "R£D" will be used throughout the paper to spe-
cify Research and Development. 
2/ Within the IDB/ECLA Programme studies see especially J. Katz et al's 
study-of Ducilo S.A., Argentina, which contains a detailed description and inter-
pretation of the main research lines and evolution of Ducilo Rayon's R £ D progra-
mme. J. Katz et al, Productividad, Tecnología y Esfuerzos Lócales de Investigación 
y Desarrollo , Programa BID/CEPAL Monografía de Trabajo N° 13, Buenos Aires, Marzo 
1978, in particular, pp. 35-51. See also C. Dahlman and F. Valadares, From Techno-
logical Dependence to Technological Development: The Case of the Usiminas Steel 
Plant in -Brazil, Working paper N° 21, IDB/ECLA Programme, Buenos Aires, November 
"1978, in particular pp. 218-227 on the plant's research centre and Appendix IV on 
examples of specific R £ D and operational research projects. 
To help fill this gap in our knowledge, the present paper presents the re-
sults of a detailed empirical examination of the R £ D project "portfolio" of an 
Argentine steel firm, Acindar S.A.. Its aim is to describe and discuss the charac-
teristics of a representative sample of the R £ D projects carried out by this 
firm. 
The paper is thus of the "case-study" kind, based on a particular firm's ex-
perience. So it is essential to have in mind the kind of firm involved. Acindar 
S.A. is Argentina's leading private sector steel firm and currently produces some 
500,000 tons of rolled non-flat products per year. It is also the country's lar-
gest private-ownership national firm as measured by its sales volume 3/ -which 
in recent years has been around 150 to 200 million U.S.$ per year.- It em-
ploys over 5,000 people in steel production, sales and administration, and has 
a sophisticated technical organization at its plants which includes specialized 
departments handling quality-control, project engineering, industrial engineer-
ing (operations research), maintenance engineering, information systems, etc.. 
Technologically speaking, Acindar has always been regarded as one of Argentina's 
most progressive firms. All its steel plants embody significant inputs of the 
firm's own engineering designs and adaptations, and the firm regularly publishes 
technical articles in national and Latin American trade journals and congresses. 
So this is a case-s.tudy of the R £ D performed by one of the largest and 
most technically sophisticated firms in Argentina in the field of steel pro-
duction. Therefore its findings are likely to represent a kind of "leading 
edge" of what one might expect to find in smaller and less sophisticated steel 
firms. 
Concretely, the paper explores 54- specific R £ D projects undertaken by 
Acindar between 1970 and 1974. 
The principal source of our information on these 54 projects was the set 
of three annual applications submitted by Acindar in 1972, 1973 and 1974 to 
the Subsecretariat for Science and Technology of the Argentine Government, aimed 
at securing certain tax deductions that had been recently legislated as applying 
to firm's bona fide expenditures on "scientific and technological investigations 
in the national interest". 
To prepare these applications, Acindar had to engage in much time-consuming 
work so as to (a) collect all the detailed information required by the tax legis-
lation for all the 54 R £ D projects, and then (b) present this information in 
systematic standardized form for each project. Unfortunately for Acindar (and 
many hundreds of other Argentine firms) no tax deductions on the submitted re-
search projects were ever granted by the Argentine authorities, and the relevant 
legislation was repealed. What remains is the compilation of information which 
for obvious reasons, is a potential "external benefit" to research on R £ D 
project portfolios. 
3/ Only the two largest state-owned enterprises, Yacimientos Petrolíferos 
Argentinos (petroleum) and SOMISA (steél), and the multinational car firm, Fiat, 
appeared ahead of Acindar in the list of the largest Argentine firms in 1977 pu-
blished by La Prensa Economica, Editorial Lourdes, Buenos Aires, 1977. 
Thanks to the generosity of Acindar's Directorss access to the firm's tax 
applications was granted and several weeks were then spent in reworking, analysing 
and interpreting the data contained in them. The main results emerging from this 
investigation are presented in the present paper. These results consist of: 
1) A body of descriptive findings concerning the characteristics of Acindar's 
R & D portfolio, including the type of projects, stimuli to projects, pro-
ject objectives, labour input, cost, degree of implementation, etc. This 
body of findings is presented in SectionII of the paper. 
2) The finding that the majority of the R £ D projects were of the "investment 
linked" kind -i.e. bound up with the acquisition and implementation of ca-
pital equipment additions to the existing technological stock, so that the 
assignation of resources to this kind of R £ D has to be considered as a 
joint assignation along with investment in capital equipment. This find-
ing is explored in Section III of the paper. 
3) The finding that the "strategy" for R £ D displayed by Acindar in these 
projects was an'implicit" strategy, mainly involving ad-hoc reactions by 
Acindar to particular inducement signals of the need-pull kind, but alsc 
involving some "spontaneous" and "active" elements. This finding is ex-
plored in Section IV of the paper. 
In addition to transmitting these three results, the paper also engages in a 
modest, exploratory effort to draw out some of the economic implications of the 
second and third ones -i.e. that most of Acindar's R £ D was investment-linked and 
that its R £ D strategy was an implicit, mainly reactive one. In particular, the 
paper offers, in Section III a simple theoretical model of how localized "invest-
ment-linked" R £ D can either complement or substitute for capital equipment invest-
ment, and in Section IV some speculative arguments in favour of a more explicit 
R £ D strategy. 
It must be emphasized, however, that although both this model and the specula-
tions on explicit R £ D strategy arose as a result of reflecting on features of 
Acindar's R £ D that emerged in the empirical analysis, we cannot claim that either 
the model or the speculations are validated by the empirical results that led to 
their conception. Such validation (or refutation) would depend on further empiri-
cal work beyond the scope of this paper. 
The main hope of the paper is that it will demonstrate the value of detailed 
research into the R £ D portfolios of Latin American firms, and thus contribute to 
strengthening the empirical coverage of this at present neglected area. 
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II. CHARACTERISTICS OF ACINDAR»S R 6 D PROJECT PORTFOLIO. 
This section is concerned to describe the main characteristics of Acindar's 
R 6 D project portfolio, as derived from the analysis of the data in the tax 
applications. 
However, before reporting on these characteristics, two important methodologi-
cal questions need to be clarified. These are (1) What definition of R £ D was 
Acmdar using when supplying data on its R £ D spending and projects in the tax 
deduction applications? (2) How representative are these 54 R £ D projects of 
the complete set of R £ D projects carried out by Acindar in the period concern-ed? 
We shall now discuss these two questions, starting with the one on the defi-
nition of R £ D. 
The R £ D projects on which tax deductions could be granted were specified in 
the rules governing the applications as including 
"the design of prototypes, development of new processes, 
use of non-routine raw materials, product engineering, 
pilot plant operations and non-routine tests" 
but as excluding 
"tasks related to methods engineering, production 
programming and control, operations research, routi-
ne quality controls, product style changes, market 
research, sales promotion, feasibility studies, or 
services to clients". 4/ 
This definition of what could and could not be counted as R £ D projects for the 
purpose of tax deduction corresponds rather well with the distinction between "R £ D" 
activities and "technical services" activities as defined by the OECD Frascati Ma-
nual. 5/ 
4/ Information based on the circular Beneficios Impositivos previstos en la 
LegisXación vigente en la República Argentina: Promoción de las Actividades Cien-
tíficas y Técnicas en el sector privado (Tax benefits contained in the current le-
gislation of the Argentine Republic: Promotion of Scientific and Technological 
Activities in the Private Sector), Secretaría de Planeamiento y Acción del Gobier-
no, ?uOsecretaría de Ciencia y Técnica, agosto de 1972. 
5/ See the "Measurement of Scientific and Technical Activities',' OECD DAS/ 
SPR/70*.40 (mimeo), 1970, Chapter 2, pp. 8-21 (otherwise known as the "Frascati 
Manual") for the OECD definitions. These are fully reproduced as an Appendix 
to Christopher Freeman, The Economics of Industrial Innovation, Penguin, Har-
mondsworth, 1974. 
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In practice it meant.that quite a large number of minor projects with a 
"research component" carried out by Acindar's Industrial Engineering Department, 
Quality Control" Department, Engineering and Maintenance Department, etc. were not 
submitted for tax deduction nor included in the figures for Acindar's total R & D 
spending, because they could not be counted as R £ D. 
So far so good. We now come, however, to a significant difference in the 
"tax application" definitions of R £ D and the OECD definition of R £ D, which 
relates to the precise interpretation as to which kinds of activities and expen-
ditures connected with the "development of new processes" and "product engineering" 
should be included as "R £ D" and which should be excluded. So far as the OECD 
Frascati Manual is concerned, the term R £ D is closely associated to the concept 
of "off-line" experimental work, pilot plant work and prototype development. As 
a result, such activities as design and drawing work which modifies on-line equip-
ment, or trial production and tooling up for new or modified equipment being install-
ed in the production line, do not count as "R £ D". Although such activities do 
transparently involve process modification and/or new product diversification, the 
fact that they take place "on line", rather than in a pilot plant, excludes them 
from being termed R £ D according to the conventions outlined in the Manual. 
In contrast, it is clear that Acindar interpreted the tax-application defini-
tion of R £ D as including the engineering design work and start-up work associated 
with the direct introduction into the production line of new processes and products. 
Indeed virtually the entire class of the projects which we shall be terming "invest-
ment-1inked" R £ D projects fall into this category. 
It will therefore be essential for the reader to remember (a) that only those 
projects which we term "experimental" R 6 D projects can be regarded as directly 
corresponding to the OECD definition of "R £ D", and (b) that the term " R £ D" as 
used from now on in this paper refers to both "investment-linked" R £ D and "expe-
rimental" R £ D. 
With these points clear, we now proceed to the question as to how representati-
ve is our sample of 54 R £ D projects. 
The answer is that it can be taken as a highly representative sample. This is 
because Acindar's objective in filling out the application forms was to include all 
those projects that could be considered as falling within the scope of the legisla-
tion and for which adequate information could be gathered from the firm's records 
so as to document and substantiate the information to be provided in the applications. 
As it was plainly in the firm's interest to secure tax deductions on the maximum num-
ber of projects, a considerable effort was made to assemble the necessary information 
on all the ones that could possibly be included. Although some projects got left out, 
it is clear that the 54 projects represent the great majority of the projects actua-
lly undertaken in the period concerned and include all the important ones. 
Two "caveats" do, however., need to be stated. 
Firstly, no reference is made in the list of R £ D projects to any project re-
lated to a major technology acquisition which Acindar was making in the 1973-74 
period, namely a second electric arc furnace and continuous casting lines for one 
of its plants. In fact all the R £ D projects refer exclusively to "improvement 
efforts" based on the already installed technology in Acindar's three plants. The 
projects are therefore, representative of the firm's 'improvement-effort" R £ D 
and not of its R £ D in connection with major acquisitions of new plant. 
- 6 -
Secondlys -as we pointed out earlier- the fact that the tax legislation deli-
berately excluded projects of the "Technical Services" type from being'presented 
meant that a large number of minor projects with a "research component" carried 
out by Acindar's Industrial Engineering Department Quality Control Department, 
Engineering and Maintenance Department, etc. were not submitted for tax deduction 
because they could not be counted as R 6 D. 
The sample is thus highly representative of all the improvement-type R 6 D 
projects carried out by Acindar (including both "experimental" and "investment-
linked" R 6 D) in the period concerned, but it excludes the range of minor pro-
jects with a research component stemming from the firm's technical departments 
i.e. projects which can be grouped under the "technical services" heading. 
Having dealt with the two methodological questions, we can now proceed to 
report the findings which we obtained on the characteristics of Acindar's R 6 D 
spending and of the 54 R 5 D projects. These findings are summarized below: 
1. Acindar in 1972-74 spent on average 0 .5% of sales on its own direct labour 
input to the R 6 D projects which it undertook, and some 2.5 to 5 times this 
amount on other technical services and tasks. By way of comparison, it spent 
9 to 14 times this amount on imported capital equipment. 
2. There were no Acindar staff assigned full-time to R 6 D in the years ana-
lysed. Nor was there any separate R & D department. The 117 staff said to 
participate in R £ D devoted an average of 18.4% of their time to it in the 
year 1972-73. 
3. This expenditure of endogenous resources and time, and the projects that 
were analysed9 all refer to modest, incremental, R & D efforts, aimed at se-
curing improvements in, or product diversifications from^ , the plant's existing 
technology. In addition these projects can all be considered to fall into the 
theoretical category of "locali zed R & D efforts and technical changes. 6/ 
6/ The key idea in "localized technical change is that it involves techni-
cal changes in one particular production technique, and not others. For example, 
when in the course of operating a plant, some new know-how is generated which helps 
to improve that plant's performance via technical changes introduced using this new 
know-how, the technical change is regarded as being "localized" at that plant if 
the new know-how has little relevance or "spillover" from the point of view of im-
proving performance via technical change at other plants. Or -to put it another 
way- if new "know-how" is fcarochial^ in the sense of being largely applicable to 
the idiosyncratic circumstances and machinery of a particular plant, but largely 
inapplicable outside that plant, then the new know-how and the technical changes 
it helps generate for that particular plant can both be regarded as "localized". 
If, on the contrary, such "know-how" is readily applicable to different plants 
(or, in economists language across a range of techniques,} then one might term 
that know-how as being of "generalized" rather than "localized" value. In prac-
tice the know-how going into technical changes nearly always contains a mixture 
of'localized" and "generalized" elements. However a great number of the minor 
changes and improvements introduced in particular plants - such as in the present 
case - have a strongly "localized"character because they are designed as small 
additions which must fit in with the particular unique combination of machines, 
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4. 75 to 85% of R & D expenditure was on "investment-linked" projects compared 
to only 15-25% on'fexperimental" projects. The special feature of the "investment-
1inked" projects was that the implementation of these projects via investment in 
capital equipment was already built into these projects' objectives at the start. 
In other words, the particular R & D to be performed was the R 6 D necessary to 
successfully specify and/or implement an investment in capital equipment that was 
already decided on prior to the initiation of the project. In contrast, the "ex-
perimental projects" were ones in which any future implementation depended on the 
results of the R & D project. In other words implementation was not already built 
in at the"start, and the mission of the experimental projects was only to generate 
new information upon which a subsequent decision to implement, via a new project, 
might later be taken. Of the 54 projects, 37 were investment-linked and 17 we-
re exper imental. 
5. 50-55% of the R & D expenditure was on "exclusively-process-change" projects 
compared with 45-50% on "new-product-linked" projects. 
6. Fully 60-70% of R & D expenditure was devoted to just seven large investment-
linked projects, costing from $ 100,000 to $ 500,000 in terms of Acindar's la-
bour input. The other 30-40% of expenditure was shared out amongst the other 47 
projects, most of which cost less than $ 20,000 each in terms of Acindar's labour 
input. 
7. The modest technical complexity of the projects is illustrated by the fact 
that the average level of Acindar university and technically trained manpower input 
to projects, both of the investment-linked and experimental types, was only about 
2 man-years. Also, only 5 of the total of 54 projects were expected to take 
more than two years to complete. 
8. Virtually, all the investment-linked projects were completed, and by their 
nature, already had implementation built into their objectives. Most of the ex-
perimental projects were also completed but only about one in three went on to a 
successful commercial implementation. Failure to implement or failure in in pie-
mentation of the experimental projects was three of four times as often due to 
commercial reasons as due to technical ones. Conclusion: investment-linked pro-
jects were characterized by low technical uncertainty and low commercial uncer-
tainty. Experimental ones seemed to be characterized by mostly low technical un-
certainty, but considerable commercial uncertainty. 
9. Most of the projects were clearly stimulated by specific market demands, spe-
cific production problems or specific raw materials constraints. But a minority 
seemed to originate in the spontaneous suggestions of the firm's technical staff, 
or in the firm's desire to maintain its "technological leadership" position by 
launching advanced products in certain product lines (For more details, see Sec-
tion IV). 
methods and men that each plant uses. They are —as it were- "plant-specific" 
changes. For the original theoretical reference to "localized" technical change, 
see A.B. Atkinson and J.E. Stiglitz, "A New View of Technological Change". Econo-
mic Journal, Vol. LXXXIX 315, September 1969. An interesting empirical paper 
touching on this subject (and mentioning specifically the idea of "system-specific" 
and "firm-specific" know-how) is G.R. Hall and R.E. Johnson, "Transfers of United 
States Aerospace Technology to Japan", in R. Vernon Ed., The Technology Factor in 
International Trade, Columbia University Press, New York, 1970, pp.305-358. 
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10. The objectives of the R S D projects were varied. The leading primary objec-
tives for the projects were (1) to launch, or support the launch of new products 
(37% of the sample) (2) to stretch production capacity for existing products (24%); 
and (3) to reduce existing product cost (17%). Less important, but still signifi-
cantly frequent primary objectives were (4) to ease raw material supply restrictions 
(11%); and (5) to improve product quality (9%). Half the sample also had secondary, 
or additional objectives in addition to their primary ones. 
This completes our summary of the project portfolio characteristics emerging 
from our exploration of the tax application data. However we do not intend to ana-
lyse all these characteristics. Rather9 our idea in presenting these findings was 
to first familiarise the reader with the overall character of the portfolio of pro-
jects we are dealing with, prior to proceeding to a more detailed discussion of two 
particular characteristics in Sections III and IV below. These two particular 
characteristicsare , as mentioned in-the introduction, the "investment-linked" cha-
racter of most of the projects, and the type of R 6 D "strategy" which underlies 
the projects in the portfolio. We now turn to this more detailed discussion, 




III. AN EXPLORATION OF LOCALIZED "INVESTMENT-LINKED" R 6 D 
A striking fact that emerged from the empirical analusis of the portfolio of 
projects is that the majority of them were "investment-linked". In other words 
they wece research projects which inherently involved investments (nearly always 
in equipment) and in which the specific target of research was to generate the ne-
cessary information, designs, specifications, components and adaptations etc.-
i.e. the necessary "localized know how" 7/ needed to support the purchases of 
equipment accompanying each project and to ensure the project's subsequent success-
ful implementation. Moreover, the preponderance of "inv-stment-linked" projects 
over the 'fexperimental" ones was not merely reflected in their numerical superio-
rity (37 vs. 17 projects) but also in the relative expenditures involved. Thus, 
the investment-linked projects accounted for 75 to 80% of Acindar's direct ex-
penditure on the labour input to the overall sample of projects, compared tc only 
20 to 25% for the experimental projects. 
Hence to a first approximation, one is justified in ignoring the experiments^ 
projects completely, and considering Acindar's R 6 D effort as consisting exclusi-
vely of localized R £ D carried out as part of investment-linked projects. 
Yet, if this is so, then it suggests that the economics of assigning resources 
to this localized R £ D 7/ are closely linked to the economics of the investments 
of which these localized R 6 D efforts form a part. In other words, there seems 
to be a strong prima facie case for examining both assignations of resources /an' 
ly, i.e. investment in the exogenously acquired "hardware" added to fixed assets and 
the expenditure on the endogenously generated "software" (the localized R £ Dl *-hat 
accompanies it. This perspective allows one to formulate questions, such as - 'c 
what extent can these two assignations of resources be considered as complements, 
and to what extent can they be considered as substitutes? In either case , what worn 
an optimum "mix" of expenditure on hardware and software consist of? At the back of 
one's mind lies the idea that here is some kind of joint maximisation problem. 
If this view of the problem is accepted, then although the average 0.5% of its 
sales spent by Acindar on R £ D may seem like "peanuts", its economic impact or. the 
firm may nevertheless be great -given that these small localized R £ D expenditures 
may strongly influence the degree of "efficiency" with which the 9 to 15 times 
larger capital equipment investments can be implemented by the firm. 
In fact, consideration of some examples of the investment-linked R £ D projects 
in the portfolio definitely supports this "interactive" view of the relationship 
between investment in capital equipment and investment in the localized R £ D asso-
ciated with it. In particular our attention was drawn to three basic economic 
7/ The reader is referred to the earlier discussion of the meaning of "loca-
lized" know-how and R £ D in the footnote to page 7. 
features of localized investment-linked R 6 D that seemed to apply to these pro-
jects. 
1) In many projects localized R 6 D seems to act as a complement to the in-
vestment in exogenous, embodied technology, in the sense that the per-
formance of this embodied technology, when fitted into the complex of 
the firm's existing machinery, is better than it would otherwise have 
been if this localized R 6 D had not been performed at all, or if not 
as much of it had been performed. 
A good example relates to the installation and implementation of on-li-
ne quality control equipment. Here the precise location of the equip-
ment in the production line and the formulation of the procedures and 
the precise timing of the quality control operations to be performed 
are clearly critical in making the investment succesful -yet the de-
termining of the location, procedures and timing is obviously a problem 
requiring localized R 6 D. 
In such cases localized R 6 D "works with" or "complements" an already 
defined exogenous design or piece of equipment. We can therefore term 
it "capital-complementing" localized R £ D. 
2) In a lesser number of projects the localized R 6 D and its accompanying 
capital equipment investment are concerned with, and embody, an alterna-
tive "localized" design-concept that acts as a substitute for a much lar-
ger investment in capital equipment that would have been needed had it 
been desired to accomplish the same performance increases using a more 
standard design concept based on "out of the catalog" exogenous techno-
logy. Good examples of this are provided by the projects involving re-
forms made to the rolling mills in the Rosario and Acevedo plants. In 
these cases, ingenious adaptations, layout changes,and relatively minor 
equipment additions designed locally were able to accomplish very subs-
tantial increases in mill production capacity that would have required 
far more capital investment to accomplish by more traditional methods 
based exclusively on exogenous embodied technology. In such cases we 
can talk of localized R £ D being of the "capital-substituting" kind. 
3) Previously acquired "learning" (learning-by-doing) often seems to have 
contributed a great fraction of the "localized know-how" that, in effect, 
"complemented" or "substituted" for new capital investment. In other words 
localized R & D expenditures taking place simultaneous with investments can 
in some sense be regarded as "building" on the already available stock of 
relevant "localized know-how " accumulated previously through learning-by-
doing. Such localized R & D expenditures apparently both add some needed 
new "units" of localized know-how, and at the same time systematize the pre-
viously accumulated "units" available from past learning-by-doing. This 
suggests that the "effectiveness" of a dollar spent on localized R £ D in 
connection with an investment project is partly a function of the extent 
of the previous learning that occured with regard to the functioning of that 
part of the plant into which the investment is to be inserted. 
Accepting the existence of these three economic features of "localized invest-
ment-linked" R £ D, we shall now attempt to see if some kind of simple model can be 
devised to exhibit their workings. 
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Towards a simple model 
A way in which the problem might be modelled is as follows: suppose that a 
firm has a stock of capital Ko with which it is operating normally and producing 
output Qe . This is its status in the initial time period t D. Then, in the next 
period, we shall suppose that it has allocated a fixed amount, say iKo 9 to in-
vest where i is a constant. 8/ 
Our firm's problem is to invest this sum in the most efficient possible manner 
through introducing improvements, additions and adaptations to its existing stock 
of capital K 0 What we visualise is that to achieve these improvements there are 
essentially two related uses which the firm can make of these investment funds iKo 
These are (1) to apply these funds to purchasing new exogenous embodied capital 
(machines) for uniting with the existing capital stock; and (2) to apply these funds 
to localized disembodied R £ D of the "investment-linked" kind so as to produce in-
formation helpful in the better specification, adaptation and implementation of the 
particular machinery additions that are contemplated, including any adaptations that 
may be needed to the existing capital stock as a result of these additions. Funds 
spent on the first use will be symbolised by the letter K. Funds spent on the se-
cond use will be sjsnbolised by the letter R. Obviously K + R = iKo , the budget 
constraint on investment. 
The firm's maximisation problem is to choose that combination or "balance" of 
expenditures on K and R which will maximise the benefits which it will secure from 
investing in improvements to its existing plant. If the firm invests nothing in 
localised R 6 D, the chances are that it will commit significant errors in speci-
fying the equipment to be bought with K and that it will also encounter unexpected 
difficulties and "bugs" which will slow down-or make more costly the production ob-
tained from the "improved" block of capital consisting of K0 + K. If, on the other 
hand, the firm invests its entire investment budget in localized R & D and does not 
buy a single new piece of equipment then it might in the extreme case expect no pro-
ductivity or performance improvement whatever, (or, more plausibly, it could expect 
sharply diminishing returns on this localized R £ D expenditure, as the opportunities 
for squeezing performance improvements out of the existing machinery through apply-
ing purely disembodied localized know-how would be quickly saturated 9/.) The 
conclusion is that some positive level of "localized" R £ D expenditure by the firm 
in relation to its hardware investment, K, can be hypothesised as being "optimal". 
But how can this possible "optimum" be located? What are the factors that 
might determine it? 
8/ If we wish to require that the application of this investment to the existing 
block~~of capital should fall within the category of "incremental" or "improvement" in-
vestments then we could require that say 0 ii |0.2. 
9/ In Hollander's study of the Du Pont plants, he found that "90% of cost reduct-
ions owing to technical change were dependent on (capital) investment at textile-yarn 
plants, and 80-90% at tyre-cord plants", S. Hollander, The Sources of Increased Effi-
ciency^ M.I.T. Press, 1965. 
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To begin to answer these questions, we obviously must try to say something more 
about how the "efficiency" of an incremental capital equipment investment is supposed 
to depend on the firm's expenditure on localized R 6 D in connection with this invest-
ment . 
To start off with, we shall consider only "capital-complementing" localized 
R £ D (i.e. when localized R 6 D acts as a complement to a standard "out of the ca-
talog" investment in exogenous, embodied technology in the sense of improving its 
precise specification and detailed implementation). Some initial ideas about the 
form of the relation between K, the machinery investment, and R the expenditure on 
localized R £ D in relation to it, are expressed in Diagram 1 overleaf. This shows 
an isoquant formed from what we shall call the "incremental production function". 
This is a function which describes the percentage increase in output capacity which 
is obtainable from our initial plant when K more equipment of a particular "standard" 
design-concept is installed in it and R of-localized R £ D gets spent on specifying 
and implementing this particular equipment. We suppose that q = f ( K 0 , K , R). 
The isoquant in Diagram 1 represents all the input combinations of K and R re-
quired to produce, say, a 20% increase in the plant's production capacity by means 
of an investment in this particular1 kind of equipment of the order of 10% of the ini-
tially installed capital stock. The two scales to which the diagram is drawn are de-
liberately chosen so as to illustrate the relative orders of magnitude of the equip-
ment expenditures vs. the localized R £ D expenditures (which experience suggests 
are often of the order of 5:1 to 20:1). The units of the two scales are, on the 
K scale, "units" of capital, and on the R scale "units" of localized know-how, and 
the prices at which units of these two factors can be "bought" by the firm are set 
at $ 1 per unit in each case, which makes the firm's price line slope at 45? 
Obviously there are some acute definitional problems with the concept of a "unit" 
of localized know-how, but we shall ignore these for the moment. We can think of 
the price per unit of localized know-how as being closely related to the salary 
levels of those of the firm's personnel who carry out the localized investment-
linked R £ D projects. A crucial point, which does, however, form part of our 
model later on is that units of R cannot be'{purchased" from the firm's own staff in 
unlimited quantities. This is because the firm has only a limited number of staff 
capable of carrying out these activities. 
Let us now turn to see what this Diagram 1 suggests. Its essential points are 
as follows : 
1) If no expenditure on localized R £ D relevant to the investment is made (i.e. 
no extra units of localized know-how beyond those already available from past 
"learning-by-doing" are deliberately generated), then K^ has to be invested 
in capital equipment to produce a 20% output capacity increase. Essentially 
what this means is that the investment in this particular kind of equipment 
gets "overloaded" or "over-engineered" due to ignorance. A very simple exam-
ple of over-engineering would be when, say, a 3500 Horse Power engine is spe-
cified when more- localized know-how would have shown that 3000 H.P. was su-
fficient. In other words the design includes surplus equipment items or super-
flous safety factors or operating features that increase capital equipment cost 
and could perfectly well be left out. 10/ 
10/ A pioneering empirical and theoretical microeconomic treatment of the pro-
blems of "overdesign" (and "under-design") in process plants can be seen in 
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Diagram 1: Isoquant of K and R input Combinations required to 
produce a 20% increase in a plant's production 
capacity. 
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2) If, however, the firm devotes resources to localized R & D, in connection 
with this particular kind of equipment, it can specify and implement this 
capital equipment more effectively, so that somewhat less capital is needed 
to get tfie desired capacity increase. In other words, localized R 6 D is 
traded off against capital equipment cost reductions in the travel down the 
isoquant slope. The optimum point is given by the tangent of the price line 
to the isoquant at point T, corresponding to capital investment of K^ and 
research expenditure R^. This is the resource allocation that achieves the 
desired capacity increase at the lowest outlay. Capital costs can however 
be slightly further reduced if research is increased to R . At this point, 
"saturation" is reached in the sense that any further expenditure on localized 
R 6 D would be redundant -i.e. unable to reduce capital requirements any fur-
ther . 
3) We can also extract from the diagram a fairly precise meaning for the term 
"capital complementation", for the diagram shows that when a block of addi-
tional capital K^ , is "complemented" by localized research R^, the increased 
output achievable from this additional capital is equal to what could have 
been achieved by the addition of a larger block of capital K , uncomplemented 
by any localized R 6 D. K^ / K gives the capital complementation ratio achieved 
in this case. 
4) There are, moreover, some other points that can be derived from this diagram 
by introducing different assumptions about the price and availability to the 
firm of each of the two factors, K and R, involved in the incremental product-
ion function. One such point concerns the fact that units of R can also be 
bought from outside firms (consultants or machinery suppliers). To model this 
we might imagine that such units acquired "out-house" cost three to five times 
what they can be bought for "in-house" (because of the high travel costs, sala-
ries, and'learning-time" inherent in outside consultancy). This has the effect 
of sliding the price line up to the angle of a "ladder" leaning against the ca-
pital axis. The result is that it becomes optimal for the firm to tolerate a 
greater extent of "over-engineering" of its capital investments than would have 
been optimal if it had been able to count on a lower cost of creation of loca-
lized know-how through the efforts of its own personnel. Interestingly this 
situation can also come to pass when a firm has such a high rate of investment 
in relation to its available qualified personnel that these latter only have ti-
me to do the localized R £ D needed for a fraction of the investment being ca-
rried out. 11/ Since such qualified personnel are, in the short run, an ine-
lastic factor, the firm in such cases cannot buy any more units of R at "inter-
nal" prices and can only acquire additional units from the consultancy market at 
higher prices. 
Francisco C. Sercovich, Ingenieria de Diseño y Cambio Técnico Endógeno, (Design Engi-
neering and Endogenous Technical Changé, Monografía de Trabajo N°19, -IDB-ECLA Pro-
gramme, Buenos Aires, agosto, 1978. 
11/ This kind of situation also has a macroeconomic parallel, when whole coun-
tries (eg. Brazil) or highly dynamic sectors within countries (eg. steel in Venezue-
la at the present time) experience such rapid growth rates of investment that the 
growth in the supply of qualified local personnel from the local educational system 
and from learning-by-doing in industry cannot keep up. The inefficiencies this gene-
rates have been theoretically explored in an exciting paper by Richard Eckhaus "Absor-
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We now come on to the "capital-substituting" case. This refers to situations 
when localized R 6 D does not merely "complement" an existing "standard" exogenous 
design,by more precise specification and implementation, but introduces an essentia-
lly new "design-concept" for the investment- This design-concept is one that relies 
much more on ingenious adaptations of the firm's existing equipment than does the 
former investment. The idea is that this new design-concept, the fruit of localized 
R £ D, enables an equivalent increase in performance to be gained at much lower 
investment cost than with the former idea -hence the term 'bapital-substituting".12/ 
In Diagram 2 overleaf we have tried to display several features of "capital-
substituting" localized R 5 D, We shall now explain this diagram, and then go on 
to discuss some of the results that can be derived from it. 
The diagram shows two isoquants. These are AB and CD. AB is the isoquant 
of K and R input combinations needed to produce an X% increase in the plant's 
existing production capacity using a "capital intensive" technique of an essentia-
lly "standard" design i.e. one which is normally obtainable from a machinery su-. 
pplier*s existing range. The isoquant has the same features as the one portrayed/ 
in Diagram la in the sense that localized R £ D is needed to "complement" the in^ 
vestment in this standard design. CD, on the other hand, depicts an alternative 
isoquant which shows the K and R input combinations needed to produce the same X% 
increase in the plant's capacity using a "capital-substituting" design-concept ba-
sed on the application of a considerable input of localized know-how. 
Also shown on the diagram are three different price lines representing diffe-
rent ratios of the cost to the firm of units of capital equipment versus "units" of 
localized R £ D. 13/ 
ptive capacity as a Constraint due to Maturation Processes", in J.N. Bhagwati and 
R. S. Eckhaus 9 Development and Planning^Essays in Honour of Paul Rosentein Rodan, 
M.I.T. Press, Cambridge 1973. 
12/ l&cellent "real-life" examples of capital-substituting localized R £ D 
were provided by the various projects in the portfolio concerned with reforms to 
the billet ftill and bar £ section mill in Acindar's"Rosario"plant, and with the 
adaptations of the Morgan N° 1 mill in the firms "Acevedo" plant. 
13/ Strictly speaking, it could be claimed that we should not have put both 
isoquants on the same diagram, given that the type of localized know-how (units-
of R) needed for the capital-intensive technique is different from the type of lo-
calized know-how needed for the capital-substituting technique. (Indeed in our 
model we have assumed that the relevant know-how is specific to each technique and 
that there is no spillover). However we can conceptually imagine that the relevant 
know-how in each case can. be divided up into "packages" or "units" which are appro-
ximately equivalent in terms of their degree of "complexity", "difficulty to obtain", 
etc. -and thus compare the number of such "units" of localized know-how that are 
needed in either case. 
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Diagram 2: Isoquants of K and R input combinations required to produce 
an X% production capacity increase by means of (i) a capi-
tal-intensive design, and (ii) a capital-substituting design. 
Standard , c a p i t a l - i n t e n s i v e d e s i g n 
w \ 




If accurate knowledge of the two isoquant forms can be assumed, then optimum 
choice for the firm, as between the capital-intensive and capital-substituting de-
signs, simply depends on the slope of this price line. At "low research cost", the 
capital-substituting design is the optimum one. And at "high research cost", the 
capiial-intensive design is optimal. There is also a research cost to capital cost 
ratio at which the firm would be indifferent as between the two designs. 
But what determines the slope of the price line, and along with it, the de-
sirability to the firm of engaging in a localized "capital-substituting" R & D 
project? The answer of course, is that several different factors can help to de-
termine its slope. We shall briefly mention three of them, so as to see how each 
affects the localized R 6 D decision as visualised through our model. 
Firstly, consider the stock of past "learning-by-doing" which our firm may. 
have accumulated concerning its existing capital equipment. It seems reasonable 
to assume that if this stock ia large, then the cost to the firm of producing the 
relevant localized know-how for the capital-substituting design will be much lower 
than it would be for a firm operating with similar equipment but without this stock 
of experience. (For example, the latter firm might have been producing for only 
a short time or else lost key engineers who departed to other firms taking their 
"learning-by-doing" with them). The cost of capital equipment to both firms may, 
however, be supposed to be the same. The result is that the "experienced" firm 
will have a relatively "low research cost" price line, and the "inexperienced" 
firm will have a relatively "high research cost" price line. This is one reason 
why localized "capital-substituting" R 6 D projects are more likely to be under-
taken by experienced than by inexperienced firms. 1*4/ 
Secondly, it is obvious that the cost of capital also determines the slope of 
the price line. If foreign exchange is very short, or import duties on imported 
capital equipment high, this will bias the choice towards the research-intensive 
-i.e. capital-substituting design. 
Thirdly, if we suppose that the firm does not have, ex-ante, a completely clear 
idea of the likely cost of the localized research needed for the capital-substituting 
design, then it might overestimate (or underestimate) these research costs, thus taking 
its decision on the basis of a "ficticious" price line. We would expect that the most 
common case, in practice, would be the overestimation by inexperienced firms of the 
research costs for capital-substituting designs. If this is right, it will lead to 
underinvestment by inexperienced firms in capital-substituting localized R 6 D and 
overinvestment in exogenous capital equipment of "standard" design. 
Ik/ Notice, however, that at very high values of the research-costs to capi-
tal rental ratio even the firm which has a valuable past stock of learning-by-doing 
will still find it optimal to select the capital-intensive technique. Conversely, 
at very low values of this ratio, it will pay even the firm which does not have a 
valuable stock of past learning to invest heavily in localized R £ D so as to devise 
the capital-substituting technique. 
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Our model can also be used to illustrate how the choice of techniques (and 
associated choice of localized research project) may be affected by factor restrict-
ions. If the firm's investment budget does not permit as much as K ci units of 
capital equipment to be bought, then expenditure on localized R 6 D relevant to the 
capital-substituting technique is the only course open if the capacity increase is 
to be obtained. If, on the other hand, resources for research are restricted (e.g. 
because of the lack of internal personnel to perform it) such that less than R-^ hr 
units localized know-how can be bought (the threshold requirement for even the 
"experienced" firm to actually develop the capital-substituting design) then the 
only option open is to select the more capital-intensive technique, which requires 
less localized R 6 D input. 
This completes our presentation of the model. We believe it throws light on 
certain aspects of the economics of "investment-linked" R & D projects of the kind 
found to make up the bulk of Acindar's R & D project portfolio. It should be em-
phasized, however, that we are not claiming to have presented an actual behaviou-
ral model of how decisions on investment-linked R & D projects get taken in Acindar. 
Rather, we have presented a speculative model as an aid to exploring some of the 
factors that underly such decisions. 
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IV. SOME ASPECTS OF ACINDAR'S R £ D "STRATEGY" 
This section is concerned with clarifying the nature of the specific "strategy" 
displayèd by Acindar in its R £ D portfolio, and with speculating on arguments in 
favour of a more explicit strategy. 
To start with, there is no doubt whatever that- at least in the period under con^ 
sideration (1970-74)- Acindar did not have an explicit "R 6 D" policy. This was' de-
monstrated not only by the absence of any separate R 6 D department , but also by the 
fact that when the tax deduction legislation for R £ D projects was published, Acindar 
did not have readily available any systematically organized information on the diffe-
rent R £ D projects which it was carrying out in its different plants and departments, 
but had to appoint one of its staff as temporary "R £ D Director" and assign him to 
collecting and coordinating all thè data on R £ D projects so that the firm would be 
able to submit the necessary data in the tax deduction applications. 
Also consistent with this lack of explicit R £ D policy was the fact that in the 
two years 1971-72 and 1972-73, direct labour expenditure by Acindar on R £ D varied 
from roughly 0.8% to 0.2% of annual sales showing visibly that R £ D expenditure 
was not targeted at some roughly fixed level, but varied according to the number and 
type of projects being performed rather than vice versa. 15/ 
In order to identify the "implicit" strategy guiding the choice of R £ D projects, 
we consulted the tax applications so as to explore the kinds of stimuli that-had given 
rise to individual R £ D projects. Information on these stimuli were contained in the 
project descriptions in the applications. These descriptions provided reasonably de-
tailed and unambiguous data on the stimuli to the majority of the projects, though 
only vague data on a minority. In fact we had to be content with vague data for about 
one-third of the projects in the sample- especially amongst those projects involving 
the actual or potential launch of new products for which often the only reason given 
as justifying the project was "market demand" without any further details. In these 
cases we had no choice but to record the stimulus as "market demand for new product", 
which is of course a somewhat nebulousconcept. (The point is that one would like to 
know how this demand came to the attention of the firm and whether the firm in some 
cases led the market rather than following it. In a few cases we do have this in-
formation' and it is recorded in the analysis that follows). 
Accepting then, that there are some significant data limitations,we were able 
to assemble Table 1 that follows showing the detailed classification of the main 
single stimulus to each of the 54 projects, on the basis of the project descrip-
tions provided. 
15/ In an explicit R £ D programme, it is the number and type of projects that 
ad jus t -themselves according to the previously earmarked budget set; for example, as 
a fixed percentage of the previous year's sales. 
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Table li Classification of the St faul 1 to the 5*4 R & D Project» 
Origin of the stimulus Type of Stimulus Classification of the Stimulus Number of Projects 
Dna the market Seed-pull Increased market demand for existing 
product 
Market demand for better quality pro-
duct 
Karket demand for new product 
11 
13 
Etecn within Production Heed-pull , 
Capability-push 
Production problems with existing process 
Production problems with existing raw ma-
terials 
Quality defect noted with output of existing 
process 
Opportunity spotted to reduce labour costs 
Opportunity spotted to eliminate process 
stage 
Opportunity spotted to improve product yield 
Opportunity spotted to speed process up 
Opportunity visualized to utilize a radica-
lly different process to produce an exist-
ing line of products 
From the Advance of 
Technology outside the 
fins 
Capability-push Advance of the state of thé art in analyti-
cal techniques related to quality control 
Offers of technical ass&ance in metallurgy 
from National Commission of Atomic Energy 
Desire to "lead** technologically in Argentina 
in a major new product line far which foreign 
technology had been licensed 
Demonstration effect of fhe success of a new 
product in overseas markets 
From Factor Markets Reed-pull Supply restrictions and/or price increases in 
raw material inputs 6 
Quality decline in raw materials inputs 1 
TOTAL S* 
Source: Author's Compilation based on Project Descriptions contained in Acindar's presentations to the Subsecretariat for 
Science aid Technology. 
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The main point which emerges from this table is that the majority of the 
R & D projects fit rather well into a model whereby innovations get "induced" by 
quite definite "signals" of the need-pull kind- Thus even if we leave out all 
13 projects shown in the table for which the need-pull is specified only vaguely 
as "market demand for new product", we are still left with 29 projects -i.e. 54% 
of the sample, where some tangible and definite "need-pull" signal indicated the 
need for a technical change. 
This suggests that the role of the majority R 6 D projects was to respond to 
clearly identified emerging needs, whether coming frommarketplace, from product-
ion, or from restrictions in factor markets. Such R & D projects might therefore 
be described as fulfilling a,"reactive" role -i.e. they enable the firm to react 
to definite signals by improving its technology to match the specific needs involved. 
What about the other 25 projects, however, when the impulse was either of the 
"capability-push" kind, or involved the rather vaguely defined "market need pull" 
leading to new-product-linked projects? First, so far as the "capability-push" 
kinds of projects are concerned it appears that what led to them was the ability 
of individual Acindar staff to suggest improvements without the incidence of any 
special, immediate or urgent need to catalyse the suggestions. In fact we could 
say these projects resulted from the spontaneous application of "engineering 
provement criteria" by the firm's engineers to the machinery and processes under 
their control. 
Second, with regard to the 13 new product linked projects said to have 
been stimulated by "market demand", it seems likely that whilst most of these 
projects responded to specific market demand, some may well have responded to a 
strategy of "technological leadership" whereby Acindar was trying to-"lead" the 
market rather than following it. 16/ This latter kind of situation of course 
lies in the realm of'kctive" or "offensive" new product strategy (with its accompa-
nying need for localized R & D ) and not in the realm of "reactive" strategy. 
With due allowance for the gaps in our data, we can now make the following 
rough estimate regarding how the sample of 54 projects was divided up in terms 
of the nature of the stimuli involved: that some 60-70% of the P & D projects 
were of the 'Reactive" kind, responding to the emergence of quite precisely defined 
market needs, production problems or raw materials supply problems; some 15-20% 
may be considered to have emerged from the "spontaneous" application of engineering 
improvement criteria by individual technical staff; and a further 10-20% seem to 
have responded to some kind of "technological leadership" strategy, whereby the 
firm was attempting to experiment with or introduce new products or quality impro-
vements not yet put on the market by its rivals. 
16/ This hypothesis is supported by 
cases-of new product launches responding 
ted by the advance of technology outside 
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the fact that Table 1 shows four definite 
to such a strategy, classified as stimula-
the firm. 
It should, however be recognised that this is our "ex-post-facto" reconstruction 
of the characteristics of the 54 R 6 D projects. It definitely dees not reflect 
any explicit,»ex-ante, policy on the part of Acindar, that its R & D programme should 
incorporate this particular balance of "reactive" "spontaneous", and "technological 
leadership" projects. 
Hence one cannot regard these 54 projects as constituting a planned "portfolio" 
of R & D projects in the sense that this term is used by the directors of reseacrh 
laboratories. Rather, one has to regard this collection of projects as the implicit 
result of a set of projects decisions taken individually. 
Towards a more "explicit" R & D strategy 
The question obviously arises -would it not be more rational for a firm like 
Acindar to plan its R & D programme more explicitly? 
Related to this, one can ask -is the "implicitly determined" level or R & D 
expenditure the optimum one from the viewpoint of the firm ? Should it, perhaps be 
higher? What is the optimum "balance" of a portfolio between "reactive" and "active" 
projects, and between investment-linked and experimental ones? Should there be a 
separate R & D department? etc. 
Obviously, our empirical analysis of Acindar's R & D portfolio characteristics 
in this paper does not equip us to provide definite answers to these questions. Ne-
vertheless a number of observations and speculations can be advanced. 
First of all, regarding to the de-facto "implicit" R & D strategy actually follow-
ed by the firm, it should not be assumed lightly that this strategy is easily copia-
ble by any steel firm whatsoever. This is because the capacity to (i) generate 
R & D in reaction to specific need pulls (ii) generate some R & D "spontaneously" 
and (iii) generate the R & D needed to match some technological leadership projects 
is certainly not automatic, but reflects an already sophisticated technical organi-
zation. In Acindar's case this includes the quality control department and all its 
analytical and metallurgical back-up, the industrial engineering department which 
carries out methods and operations research studies, the project engineering depart-
ment, the maintenance engineering department, and many other technical offices, some 
of them closely, connected to production operations, as well as all the brain-power 
of the engineers and technicians directly in charge of production. This complex of 
"technical capabilities", although not containing separate R & D laboratory, is per-
fectly capable of generating the small project teams and combinations of resources 
needed for individual R & D projects. Therefore it is not "obvious", prima facie, 
that specialisation of the R & D function would automatically provide better R & D 
performance. One would need to show that the existing set-up suffers from problems 
of coordination, or fails to take advantage of potentially synergistic overlaps 
between different projects, or is unable to sustain some needed threshold of effort, 
or that it does not effectively select the more profitable projects, for the case 
for R & D specialisation to start becoming persuasive. 
On the question of possible "underinvestment" in R & D. It seems necessary to 
split the issue up into parts. First of all, regarding investment-linked R & D it 
follows directly from our model presented in the previous section that there always 
exists the potential for underinvestment (or overinvestment) in localized R & D 
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on any particular investment project. Such underinvestment necessarily leads 
either to "over-engineering" or "misspecification" (in the capital-complementing 
case).or else to failure to opt for attainable "capital-substituting" designs 
(a mistake more likely to be made by inexperienced firms). 
Secondly, regarding experimental R £ D projects, the relatively low commit-
ment of R £ D expenditure to projects of this kind might conceivably reflect a 
relative lack of profitable opportunities to carry out experimental projects (i.e. 
some kind of "saturation" of inventive opportunities), however a more likely ex-
planation is that it reflects that Acindar, whilst open to individual experimental 
projects suggested at the initiative of individuals or department heads, is not 
yet fully committed to experimental R£D as a "way of life", which would imply 
allocating a regular budget to it. 17/ 
There is however, evidence that an increasing interest in experimentation 
seems to be gradually emerging as a result of experience. Thus, even though Acindar 
does not have a separate R £ D department, it has for more than ten years had an 
Industrial Engineering Department which regularly carries out operations research 
studies aimed at such matters as improving yields, reducing production-cycle times, 
etc. Furthermore, the firm's quality control department, which was greatly strengthen-
ed in the past few years following Acindar's entry into the special steels field, now 
regularly experiments with new grades of special steels. The firm also now has a for-
malised R £ D department for "metallicstructures" which has grown out of the function 
of providing technical assistance to clients. 
On the face of it, the next logical step would appear to be for Acindar to pro-
vide a more sustained and explicit resource allocation to experimental projects co-
ordinated through a specialist R £ D department which would supervise or at least 
monitor the whole portfolio of experimental projects that are underway or planned. 
In any event, such a step would appear to be quite easy for Acindar to take if it 
wished to do so. 
Thirdly, regarding investment in "reactive" versus "active" R £ D projects, a 
case can be argued that the balance of Acindar's programme leans too heavily on 
"reactive" R £ D, and neglects "active" R £ D (i.e. the R £ D which we identified 
as arising spontaneously from engineer's suggestions or as a result of technologi-
cal leadership strategy rather than as a reaction to specific need pull stimuli). 
This case gains support from the idea due to Nelson and Winter that there may exist 
"natural trajectories" of technical change, appropriate to the particular "techno-
logical regime" with which a firm is working, that "focus the attention of engi-
neers on certain directions in which progress is possible, and provide strong gui-
dance as to the tactics likely to be fruitful in probing in that direction", and 
for which the 'payoffs from advancing in that direction exist under a wide range 
17/ In this context, it should be born in mind that even if no experimental 
project's at all were conducted, there would still be a very substatial and challen-
ging set of "investment-linked" R £ D tasks to perform, of the 'beactive", "spon-
taneous" and "technological leadership" kinds -so that conducting no experimental 
projects would not imply technological stagnation. 
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of demand considions". 18/ This idea is strongly corroborated by the studies on 
steel plants in Mexico, Brazil and Argentina carried out in the IDB-ECLA Programme 
in which a good number of "natural trajectories" appropriate to steel plants were 
independently discovered. 19/ Sixteen of these natural trajectories are listed 
below. 
1) Resolving bottlenecks 
2) Stretching the capacity of existing units through mechanization layout 
changes, faster loading, simplified product mix, lowered rejection rates 
etc. 
3) Reducing process cycle times 
4) Minimization of non-recuperable metallic losses and recycling of recupe-
rable losses 
5) More intensive utilization of bye-products 
6) Improved in-plant materials handling 
7) Establishment of operating routines for the principal equipment units and 
process optimization 
8) Minimization of maintenance and repair down-times 
9) Standardization and beneficiation of raw materials leading to more success-
ful operating routines and more consistent product quality 
10) Cost reduction through altered input mix 
11) Saving on energy consumption through greater thermic efficiency 
12) Extending the useful life of equipment units 
13) Extending the useful life of refractories, mill rolls and ingot moulds 
14) More exact and intensive quality control 
15) Product diversifiaction and new product development on the basis of exist-
ing equipment 
16) Organizational innovations to meet the challenges inherent in the inmense 
scale and multi-departamental complexities of modern steelmaking. 
The argument is that there is no inherent reason why all these natural trajectories 
should only be followed "reactively" i.e. when necessity arises. They can also be pur-
sued "actively" by a combination of capital investment, localized R 6 D linked to this 
investment, and experimental R 6 D. In this perspective, an explicit R & D policy, coor-
dinated with investment, and aiming at rapid advance along these natural trajectories, 
could make a 1'ot of sense. 
18/ For the concept of "natural trajectories", see R. Nelson and S. Winter, 
"In Search of .a Useiful Theory of Innovation", Research Policy (6) 1977. 
19/ The researchers involved were Luis Alberto Perez and Jesus Perez y Peniche 





The empirical analysis of Acindar's R £ D project portfolio on which this 
paper is^based has enabled us to take quite a "microscopic" look at the kind of 
R £ D performed by this enterprise. 
Whilst we cannot claim that this analysis has produced any major surprises 
-as looking at familiar objects through an optical microscope sometimes does- it 
has served to provide confirmation of (i) the essentially modest, localized, im-
provement character of Acindar's innovations, (ii) the implicit nature of Acin-
dar's R £ D strategy, and (iii) the need-pull induced character of most of the 
projects in the portfolio. 
If there was one finding that could be regarded as possibly "surprising", 
it was to discover how closely related the localized R £ D in Acindar was to 
investment in capital equipment- so much so that it seemed correct to us to 
treat this problem economically as one of joint assignation of resources. 
Our model of this joint assignation problem emphasized the alternative roles 
of localized R £ D as either "capital-complementing" or "capital-substituting". 
It underlined the relevance of the assignation of resources to localized R £ D 
in influencing the efficiency of a firm's capital investment programme. 
Therefore, one direction in which the results of this paper point is towards 
the need for a more refined theory of investment -in which localized investment-
linked R £ D would be explicitly taken into account. In this connection, an em-
pirically significant problem would be to find out more about the location and 
shape of the trade-off curve between capital investment and localized R £ D in the 
capital-complementing case. Another empirical problem would be to explore how en-
terprises actually reach investment decisions as between capital-intensive techni-
ques and possible capital-substituting alternatives. 
The other direction of research which our results indicate could be fruitful 
is to probe deeper into (a) the specification of natural trajectories in steel-
plants and (b) the evidence that an explicit, more "active" or "offensive" R £ D 
strategy aimed at proceeding swiftly along these trajectories could be demonstra-
bly superior to the kind of implicit, mostly "reactive" R £ D strategy observed in 
the present case. 
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A P P E N D I X 

Appendix. Classification of the 54 R & D Projects in Terms of 
Table 2 . the Nature of the work involved 
54 Projects "Exclusively process change" 







Process changes involving 
the design and execution of 
alterations to a whole line 
of machinery or-to a major 
stage in the production pro-
cess 4 projects. 
Process changes involving 
essentially mechanical 
engineering type changes to 
individual machines or subs-
tages in the production 
process ..... 15 projects. 
Alterations to produce new pro-
duct lines which involved adapt-
ing a whole.line of machinery or 
a major stage in the production 
process, or the adding of a new 
supplementary stage arid which 
implied something more than just 
the exercise of mechanical engi-
neering design skills 1/ 
8 projects. 
Adaptations via purely mechanical 
engineering type design projects 
for new individual machines or 
substages in the production pro-
cess required for new product 
lines 3 projects. 
Changes involving the intro-
duction of speedier and cheap-
ep methods of chemical analy-
sis required in the process 
cycle 3 projects. 
Installation followed by familia-
rization and calibration of so-
phisticated new quality control 
equipment needed for new. product 
lines with more stringent quali-





Experimental process changes 
involving trials with a sig-
nificant modification of 
process variables 
••• 4 projects 
"Studies" to improve exist-
ing product quality via 
process changes which invol-
ved investigation, tests and 
experiHiemtation with alter-
native processing methods 
... 5 projects 
Experimental new product-and-
process development projects 
involving (a) studies, tests, etc. 
to determine new product speci-
fications and related process 
variables and conditions, and 
often (b) the operation of pilot 
manufacture or a pilot line 
... 8 projects 
• Source: Author's classification based on the Project Descriptions-contained in 
Acindar's presentations to the Subsecretariat for Science 6 Technology. 
1/ For example, involving changes to a rolling-mill line or changes which invol-
ve raetallurgical factors. 
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Appendix. Ranking of the 54 R 6 D Projects in Decreasing 
Table 3. Order of the Estimated Input by Acindar of man-
months of university-trained and technically-
trained Manpower to.the Projects. 
See Key to the Table and Notes to 
the Table on p. 35. 
Expressed in man-months 
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22 Modification of reheat 
furnace and -section mill 
25 Rolling mill for special 
steels 
3U Improvements in the 
section mill 
01 Wire galvanization by 
hot immersion 
54 Conditioning of spe-
cial steels 
05 Automatic packing of 
nails 
21 Modification of reheat 
furnace and billet mill 
12 Reform of the patenting 
line 
02 Separators" for suspend-
ed wire 
20 Optimisation study for 
heat-treated spheroid 
steel 
17 Investigation to use 
steel or high carbon 
and magnesium content 

























61 210 9 124 334 





$ 483,000 1/ 
$ 438,000 
$ 128,000 
$ 47,000 1/ 
$ n.a. 
$ 100,000 
$ 248,000 2/ 
$ 35,000 
$ 103,000 1/ 
$ 19,000 2/ 
$ 11,000 
32 -
Table 3. (conto) 
28 Automation of the air-
blasting of galvanized 
pipes I-L EPC 27 27 13 
— ty— 
68 95 $ 39,000 
37 Reduction of steel pro-
duction time using nsw 
analytical systems I-L E PC 27 27 • _ 27 $ 15,000 
11 Fabrication of toroique-
ts EXP NPL 27 28 - - 28 $ 19,000 1/ 
26 Gas injection in hot air 
cupola furnace EXP EPC 25 102 - 18 120 $ 51,000 y 
10 Double rewinding unit I-L HPL 23' 40 10 16 56 $ 19.000 
0 3 Torsioning machine with 
three stations I-L NPL 22 204 - - 204 $ . 109,000 2/ 
43 Improving distribution 
of carbijros in MO 20 
steel EXP EPC 20 30 30 $ 16,000 
15 feeMnsa for r>3 luxa-
tion tests Ï-L NPL 20 2i - - 21 $ 90,000 1/ 
16 Saline fog rooa I-L NPL 18 18 - - 18 $ 8,000 
04 Differential bobbins I-L EPC 18 220 - - 22Ó $ 36,000 1/ 
44 Mechanical engineering 
drawings of Schwnag 
cropping machins I-L EPC 18 ii 18 $ 10,000 
13 Design of prototype 
metallic posts EXP HPL 17 17 - - 17 $ 5,000 
33 Oxygen cutting of 
Somisa Blooms I-L EPC 16 117 - 41 158 $ 33,000 
t»Ü Investigation of the 
rolling of high alloy 
special steels EXP. NPL 14.5 70» S _ 70.5 $ 25,000 
41 Proving out of new 
ultrasonic tests I-L WPL 14.5 17.5 - - 17.5 $ 42,000 
18 Studies of the utili-
zation Of 1008 R ingots 
in electrode fabrication EXP EPC 14 16 16 $ 16,000 2/ 
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Table 3. (cont.) 
29 Rolling of American 
type 3" and 
U-shapes I-L NPL 13 27 - 12 39 $ 22,000 
38 Adaptation of Sybetra 
oven into mobile 
hearth oven I-L EPC 13 19 - 19 $ 7,000 
39 New methods of chemi-
cal analysis I-L EPC 13 13 - 13 $ 6,000 
50 Rolling of 17.5 to 
30mm round bars from 
lOOmm billets I-L EPC 11 15 6 21 $ 13,000 
30 Rolling of angle steel I-L NPL 11 34 - 3 37 $ 16,000 
52 Diminution of flakes in steel EXP EPC 9 16 - - 16 $ n.a. 
35 injection of oxygen 
in the Siemens Martin 
furnaces EXP EPC 9 55 - - 55 $ 20,000 
42 New Processes for 
improving the quality 
of tool steel EXP EPC 9 21 - 21 $ 8,000 
51 Rolling of 32 to 50.8 
mm round bars from 
50mm billets I-L EPC 8 12 - 7 19 • $ 10,000 
03 Increase in the pro-
ductivity of barbed-
wire making machines I-L EPC 8 8 - - 8 $ 2,000 
47 Coppering in the Aetna 
standard wire drafting 
machine I-L NPL 8 22 - - 22 $ 10,000 
48 Rolling of T6I shapes I-L NPL 8 10 - 3 13 $ 7,000 
53 To reduce fusion time 
of low-alloy steels EXP EPC 7.5 9 . 5 - - 95 $ n.a. 
49 Rolling of L-shapes I-L NPL 7 11 - 6 17 $ 10,000 
23 Productivity increase 
in section-straight-
ening machines I-L EPC 6.4 27.4 13 27 54.4 $ 29,000 2/ 
Table 3. (conto) 
24 Fabrication of metallic 
post for wire-fencing EXP NPL 6 12 9 18 20 $ 8,000 
46 Compacting machine for 
wire rolls I-L EPC 6 6 65 71 $ 26,000 
08 Bar aligner I-L EPC 6 18 - 18 $ 5,000 1/ 
13 Feed system N°1 I-L EPC 6 6 - 6 $ 2,000 1/ 
27 Niobium steels EXP NPL 5 7 - 7 $ 2,000 2/ 
45 Machine for enrolling 
steel I-L EPC 5 24 5 5 29 $ 11,000 
14 Reform of galvanising 
line N°4 I-L EPC 4 15 - 15 $ 5,000 1/ 
07 Salomonic nails I-L NPL 4 4 - 4 $ 2,000 2/ 
06 Phosphating-copper-
ing line for fine 
wire immersion I-L NPL 4 5 5 $ 3,000 
32 Transfer of sections 
from straightening 
to dispatch I-L E K 3 5 6 11 $ 3,000 
31 Reduction in the re-
fining time of liquid 
steel I-L EPC 3 3 22 25 $ 5,00d 
36 Tests on quality im-
provements and new types 
of electrodes EXP NPL 1.5 1.5 - 1.5 3 $ 1,000 
¿L. - , , : 
Key to the Table ; 
a/ I-L = Investment-linked project; EXP = Experimental project. 
b/ EPC = Exclusively-process-change project; NPL = New-product-linked project 
c/ U + T = University plus technically trained manpower. 
Notes to the Table 
y implies estimated at $ 1 = 6.It pesos 
2/ implies estimated at $ 1 = 3.86 pesos 
The US$ dollar figures in the extreme right hand column refer to current dollars in 
th§ 1970-73 period -and these figures would need to be multiplied by approximately 1.5 to 
bring them up to their 1977 purchasing power. 
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